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Abstract of
NAVAL AND MERCHANT FLEET C'OORDINATION:
A NEW MARITIME STRATEGY
The military sealift requirements of the Department of
Def@nse and the cooperation of the Merchant Marine in times
of crises, national emergencies and wars are well known. The
current trend toward increasing international trade; problems
of inadequate U.S. flag commercial shipping fleet and further
reductions in the size of the active and reserve naval fleets,
requ!re that some cooperative effort be considered in a normal
peacetime environment as well as in a crisis role.
the majority of the ships of the U.S. Navy and Merchant
Marine are well over twenty years old and are inefficient and
uneconomical to operate. Positive steps are being taken to
1mp~ove the quality of each fleet within the overall budget
constraints.
It is obvious that the Merchant Marine and Naval fleets
could provide stronger support to common national objectives
if they worked in concert rather than independently as has
been normal practice.
The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Commerce
have recognized this and are ma~ing some progress in conduct-
ing joint merchant-naval operaeiortB and a study of other
r;:equirements. this paper proposes several administrative.
operational and hardware oriented concepts which will have
:iLi
the effect of making the Merchant Marine and Naval forces a
team operation and more responsive to routine operations and
a national crisis. An acceptance of these concepts should
cause the operation of both fleets to be more efficient and
productive.
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NAVAL AND MERCHANT FLEET COORDINATION:
A NEW MARITIME STRAT~GY
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Seapower. Power at sea is a combination of many factors.
Ships of war are the first to COIDe to mind for many people.
There is much more to seapower. Seapower is a matter of accesS
across the Qceans to launch military expeditions. to supply
bases in time of wa~, or to exploit the comparative advantages
of trade in time of peace. l The heart of seapower may be the
merchant fleet when consideced in its broadest perspective.
International alliances and questions of rights at sea
are external matters of policy and interests and are very much
affected by a natiou's maritime strength. The United States
relies on ocean transport for at least eighty strategic mater-
ia1s that cannot be found or pToduc~d 1n sufficient quantity
in the country.2 Industry is dependent on overseas sources and
this resource deserves protection. The United States is clearly
a seapower as indicated by its geography. Power has been de-
rived from the sea and policy should always contribute toward
the maintenance and increase of this element of power. 3
The United States bas allowed its Merchant Marine and
combatant Navy to grow obsolete and diminish in 8i2e while
other problems such as recovery from the Vietnam conflict
and demands of domestic social issues have been given higher
1
priority.4 As one looks to the future, the importance of
strength at sea and the necessity for maintaining 1t will not
diminish. The oceans will persist as the main channel by which
goods will move. The seas will also continue to be vital to
milita~y uses as in the past, both in terms of marginal con-
flicts and of the strategy of deterrence.
The relationship between the Navy and the Merchant Marine
has become severely strained in recent years. In an effort to
carryon a war on a peace-time basis, the Navy has attempted
to provide merchant type ships and services for its own pur-
poses. 5 The co-existence of a naval merchant fleet in addition
to a commercial fleet has accelerated an unfortunate and un-
healthy condition. The historical precedent was for the employ-
meot of commercial ships to provide logistical support for the
Navy. Since the U.s. Navy prOVided some of its own supply
support. regardless of the reason, this has been considered
unfair competition by most segments of the maritime industry.
Military and civil maritime problems should be v~ewed in
different perspectives and the military should make a spec~al
effort to understand the commercial shipping position. The
problem of cooperation between the military and civilian mari-
time forces cannot be dismissed as easily as one of the officers
in command in a purely ~1litary setting. It may be recalled
that the separate military services ~ere organized under the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and Unified Co~mands in order to operate
more efficiently. The requirement for a common policy and
2
accepted doctrine of the functions of the separate 'services in
the way the nation should use the Armed Forces. made the prac-
tical exercise of cooperation necessary.
It is the purpose of this paper to point out that it is
just as logical that the U.S. merchant and naval fleets have
a clear understanding of their contributton to the goals in
national policy. With a better understanding of the purpose
of all maritime assets, one may take the initial steps toward
effectively contributing to and pursuing common goals in
support of national interests.
The aim of effective employment of naval and merchant
fleets should be based on the e~periences of past crises and
not have to be relearned. The qMestions of management of mer~
chant shipping in World War II, waste in committing tonnage
to priorities less than urgent, undischarged ships and other
misuse of resources are discussed in an authoritative book.
Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War (London: Her Majes-
ty's Stationery Office and Longmans. Green and Co., 1965), by
C.B.A. Behrens.
The author had access to official documents of sources
such as the War Shipping Administration of the United States
and the British Minister of War Transport. As one can see from
a few remarks by the Minister of War Transport reproduced in
Appendix I, an attitude of cooperation, joint planning, train-
ing and an understanding of another agency's limitations and
capab~lities is necessary for efficient operations.
3
Obviously these lessons had to be relearned by the U.S.
in Korea and Vietnam. The British relearned the same lesson
in the Suez crisis in 1956 when that operation revealed an
incredible shortage of transport capability, equipment, stores
and logistic support management ability.6
There 1s some evidence that primarily because of budget
constraints, concern and discussion among the leaders of this
nation, is taking place regarding maritime goals and coordina-
tion of the agencies with oceanic responsibilities.
National Attitude Toward Marine Affairs. The recognition
of the need to make some improvement in the management of ocean
resources, defense, transportation and trade in competing in
the world market has been slow. The existing and programmed
strength and composition of U.S. naval forces is rooted in the
national objectives of the nation. The President and other
leaders have indicated that the U.S. is a leader of an alliance
of inter-oceanic communities that have major maritime interests
and depend on use of the seas. He has also stated that the
U.s. will playa more active leadership role in carrying out
the growing responsibility for the maintenance of a liberal
world trade environment. 7
There appears to be a favorable disposition both in and
out of Government, toward correction of the conditions of
obsolescence which have existed in many segments of the com-
mercial and naval fleets.
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The Chairman of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Committee has given a consensus of the feelings of Congressional,
Government agency, business and maritime labor and management
feelings toward promotion of the U.S. maritime industry. He
is of the opinion that the hearings on an analysis of the whole
area of U.S. flag vessels, merchant ship role in national
defense, availability of cargo and all the factors related to
successful ship operations are long overdue. 8
As a result of this progressive attitude toward ship-
building, and modernization of the ocean fleets, there is
considerable support for a substantial naval and merchant
shipbuilding and conversion program. A ten year $50 billion
shipbuilding and conversion program to modernize the U.S. Navy
has been proposed. 9 When one considers the obsolescence and
effectiveness of the fleet as well as the change in relative
strength between the Soviet Union and the U.S., a good case
can be made in justification of a program of this magnitude.
Reality suggests that the appropriations for the naval construc-
tion will be something less than $4 or $5 billion annually, but
the attention gained is encouraging.
The enactment of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 provided
the vehicle for a revitalization of the Merchant Marine. This
legislation was the first major updating of the national mari-
time policy in three decades. lO It could not have come about
without the support and coo~eration of the Congress. The
5
urgency and sense of optimism with which this broadly-based
program was instituted could be regarded as a major factor in
reviving the U.S. commercial fleet and an indicator as to the
level of future commercial activity.
Merchant Act of 1970. The Merchant Marine Act of 1970,
restructured and redirected the U.S. maritime policies to
provide a constructive program to restore the U.S. to the
rank of a leading maritime power. As an indication of the
status of the fleet which required such drastic action, in
1950 42 percent of U.S. foreign trade was carried in American
flag ships, and in 1970 this figure fell to 5.6 percent. II
The objectives of the new maritime policy and program
are:
8. To develop a modern and efficient American merchant
marine capable of carrying a substantial portion of U.S. trade.
b. To provide military shipping support in times of
national emergencies.
c. To improve the productivity and competitiveness of
shipping and shipbuilding industries.
d. To encourage the application of advanced technology,
innovative management and aggressive marketing programs.
e. To provide a firm foundation and direction for growth
and stability of the shipping industry.12
A substantial part of the 1970 Act deals with building
the equivalent of 300 highly productive merchant ships of
6
advanced design. These ships will be built with Federal
assistance over a ten-year period. Government and industry
have been asked to work together to rebuild the merchant fleet.
As a target goal, the construction of 25 general cargo ships,
three dry-bulk carriers, and two tankers each year during the
1970's is envisioned. 13
The new building program will provide an improved system
of construction differential subsidies. These payments will
reimburse American shipbuilders for that part of the total
ship cost which exceeds the cost of building in foreign ship-
yards. These subsidies will allow the U.S. shipbuilders to
sell their ships at world market prices for use in competition
with foreign trade despite their higher costs.
In this new plan, maritime research activities of the
government will also be enlarged and redirected. Emphasis
will be placed on practical applications of technological
advances. The joint participation of government and industry
in cooperative and cost-sharing programs is encouraged in the
areas of new developments and research prajects. 14
The results of the first year after the enactment of the
1970 Merchant Marine Bill was disappointing. The country was
experiencing a period of economic uncertainty and business was
generally at a slow pace. Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Maritime Affairs, Andrew E. Gibson, who acts in the sub-cabinet
as Maritime Administrator, had hoped to accelerate the imple-
mentation of the new shipbuilding program.
7
Start up problems
along with the poor earnings of American flag operators resulted
in some difficulty in arousing interest in new construction. IS
A summary status of the active U.S. flag merchant fleet
and ships under construction and conversion as of February
1972 is presented in Table I of Appendix II.
U.s. Naval Forces. The appropriations for U.s. Navy
ship construction for the 1972 fiscal period was slightly in
excess of $3 billion. 16 Most of this money will be committed
to programs started in earlier years such as submarines, mis-
sile ships and general purpose destroyers. The amount remaining
for new ship construction will be cut further by the impact of
inflation on labor aod material in the complex ongoing weapons
and electronics systems.
In order to modernize and remain within budget constraints,
the U.S. Navy is committed to reducing in size to a smaller,
high-quality combatant fleet. The Chief of Naval Operations
has stated that because of an inadequate budget to procure,
operate, and maintain both warships and auxiliary ships, the
Navy will be increasingly forced to rely on the Merchant Marine. I7
The size of the U.s. Navy in recent years and the continued
progressive reductions are illustrated in the following tabula-
tion:
Fiscal 1968 976 vesse1s18
1969 886
1970 796
1971 710
1972 657
1973 594
8
With a decision to concentrate on warships as a result of
low budget levels the Navy will have to carefully weigh the
risks inherent in depending on another agency for logistic sup-
port. The present capability to substitute merchant ships for
Navy replenishment and auxiliary ships is poor and inadequate.
It is believed to be a capability that can be acquired in a
relatively short time frame however. Giv·en a sincere desire,
~hich the budget has provided, and some understanding on the
part of the Navy and the Merchant Marine, tbere seems no reason
why the support functions of the Navy cannot be provided by
merchant ships and crews. The auxiliary ships of the Navy are
in fact merchant hulls fitted out for naval use and manned by
unifo~med sailors, so there are no fundamental changes.
Aside from the logistic support functions of the combatant
naval forces, the Niavy is responsible for providing and pro=
tecting sealift forces . .A former Commander of the U.S. Navy's
Military Sealift Command has described the capabil~ty of the
combatant Navy, the air strike forces, and tbe m~bile ground
tr@Qps stationed around the world as of very limited value if
there 1s no capability to support their operations. l9
The primary mission of the Military Sealift Command (MSC)
is strategic sealift. This sealift force is a Na~y fleet and
has area commands located in Oakland, Bremerhaven, Yokohama
and B~ooklyn. This organization 1s responsible for the move-
ment of military cargo throughout the world and as such is the
9
single manager operating agency for all Defense Department
sealift. 20
In normal peacetime operations as well as national emer-
gencies, the MSC relies heavily on ships of the U.S. Merchant
Marine. The MSC has a small nucleus of government-owned ships
which are configured to carry outsize cargo and deliver
material to remote parts of the world where no commercial ser-
vice is available. Other government-owned ships are special
purpose vessels such as cable layers, oceanographic research
and special project vessels to support space flights.
The MSC controls the operations of a fleet consisting of
128 government-owned ships and 113 commercially chartered
ships.21 Table II of Appendix II provides an analysis of the
American shipping potentially available to the command.
As the Defense Department's only immediately responsive
sealift force, the command is contingency-oriented. To develop
capability for wartime expansion, MSC relies primarily on the
Merchant Marine. The Merchant Marine may provide services
from its active operating ships or from the National Defense
Reserve Fleet (NDRF). For instance, during the Vietnam con-
flict MSC had 170 activated ships from the NDRF which operated
as a part of a controlled fleet of 600 ships during most of
that period. 22 It is common knowledge that 98 percent of the
material support for that conflict was carried by sealift under
the supervision of the MSC. 23
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In its role of sealift, the MSC is involved 1n developing
new types of sea delivery systems. Included in this category
are containerization of cargo, use of intermodal systems, roll-
on, roll-off vessels, innovative port and management techniques
and the design of ships which can serve multiple mission re-
quirements of the military services.
The National Defense Reserve Fleet. The National Defense
Reserve Fleet (NDRF) is composed of deactivated ships placed
out of service and maintained in storage fleets by the Mari-
time Administration of the Department of Commerce. Most of
these ships are not economically competitive and are at least
twenty-five years old.
Table III in Appendix II shows the trend in the numbers
of ships maintained in the fleet since the bulk were provided
at the close of World War II. These ships represent a marginal
sealift capability because of their deteriorating material
condition, slow speed and antiquated cargo handling capability.24
Because of the inferior operating characteristics and excessive
reactivation costs, only 381 of these vessels are considered
suitable for reactivation to meet national shipping emergen-
cies. 25 The existence of this reserve fleet has enabled the
U.S. to augment sealift capabilities during emergencies and
leave the active merchant fleet on their normal operations.
With the majority of new construction and conversion of
commercial shipping taking advantage of the economy of various
11
forms of containerization and intermodal transport, it may
be expected that the present NDRF break-bulk ships will soon
be replaced with the retired container ships, A summary of
the ships currently under construction or conversion was seen
in Table I, Appendix II. It should be noted that all new con-
struction freighters are of a container configuration.
The expanding number of container ships in the maritime
industry will dictate that Department of Defense planning adapt
to this mode of sealift. One can now appreciate the concern
of the Navy in "owning" its own ships for logisti<c support of
combatant forces and its s~alift forces for traditional break-
bulk, immediate sealift capability in response to national
emergencies.
It is clear that the Navy is willing to trade naval
auxiliary ships in order to have a better combatant fleet.
Some consideratio& must now be given to operational capabili-
ties, procedures and command and control of this new concept
of supporting the fleet with commercial vessels.
In the role of sealift, the ~avy and Department of Defense
planners shou~d 'welcome the fact there are some modern, fast
hulls in existence and figure out schemes to take advantage of
the capabilities of the barge and container ships. The most
rapid response in sealift will be in dse of those ships that
are in service and operating. All signs indicate the majority
of dry cargo vessels will be of the modern, economical inter-
modal variety.
12
An analysis of the proposed budget for fiscal 1973 shows
increased funds for federally sponsored marine programs includ-
ing shipyard activity. Table IV. Appendix II summarizes funds
for recent naval and commercial ship construction.
Two new positions in the Navy have been established to
assist in meeting the responsibility of the Merchant Marine
to provide for national defense and serve as a naval and mili-
tary auxiliary. A senior naval officer is assigned as Special
Assistant to the Maritime Administrator for consultation in
joint matters. The Commander, Naval Ships System Command, has
been assigned an additional role in commercial shipbuilding. 26
He will coordinate shipbuilding programs and ship characteris-
tics in order to satisfy Department of Defense requirements.
The Navy Department should maintain a close relationship
with the maritime industry if there is to be a smooth and
efficient transition to normal operations with the commercial
fleet. Some possibilities for a u.s. Naval and Merchant Marine
unified effort in the pursuance of common goals will be explored.
13
CHAPTER II
MERCHANT MARINE AND ITS ROLE AS A NAVAL AUXILIARY
Comm~rcial Ships ~s Naval Auxi~iaries. The Merchant
Marine Act of 1936 declared that it was a policy of the United
States to develop and maintain a merchant marine adequate to
meet the trade and defense requirements in peace and war. l
The Merchant Marine Act of 1970 provided the administrative
and financial programs which will enable the Maritime Adminis-
tration of the Department of Commerce to create a strong,
competitive American Merchant Marine to carry out that policy.
Now that the Navy is concentrating on combatant forces
and relying on the civilian vessels for auxiliary support
functions, another need for the ships the new Merchant Marine
Act can provide is established. In January 1972. the Presi-
dent did announce a new contract for nine 25,000 deadweight
ton tankers. These tankers will be built in private yards,
operated by civilians but chartered to the Navy to meet a
military requirement for shallow draft tankers. 2
The Navy and Department of Defense has been concerned
about the physical size and draft of the tanker fleet. The
trend toward supertankers to take advantage of the commercial
aspects has caused problems in maintaining a flexible posture
in contingency planning. Some supertankers can be used, but
many ports of the world and some naval operations cannot
accommodate large tankers.
14
The last of a series of four tankers with a capacity of
37,000 deadweight tons each were delivered to the Navy in
January 1972. 3 These ships are civilian operated and modern
in every respect; they have reduced crew manning with bridge
control to the engine rooms, crew comforts and are highly
automated.
These ships are privately owned, civilian manned and are
under charter to the MSC which was described earlier. Some
of the auxiliary fleet oilers manned by the Navy will be re-
placed by the service of these new tankers as they are delivered
and demonstrate the skill to carry out the task of fleet re-
fueling.
During the past few months a number of merchant marine
tankers with civilian crews have exercised with the naval
operating forces at sea and established the feasibility of
this technique. 4 This logistics technique increases the avail-
ability of fuel in distant waters for the warships and signif-
icantly increases the combat potential of those ships. When
proven, this concept may be applied to any logistic service
or auxiliary ship.
To complement the tanker fleet the Navy would like to
obtain the service of the Multi-Purpose Cargo Ships (MPS).
These vessels would be specially designed to be compatible
with the commercial unit load (container) equipment. The MPS
would be manned and under charter much the same as the tankers
15
presently in use and allow additional old naval auxiliary
service force ships to be withdrawn from the active fleet.
These ships would be available for rapid deployment in the
event of a contingency and would have the additional advan-
tages of not being in competition with commercial interests.
Desirabl~Military Characteristic~. The Merchant Marine
Act of 1936 provides for the Department of Defense to pay for
national defense features required in ships which will be con-
sidered as military auxiliaries. Some of the military features
desired not only require additional expense in construction,
but also cause the operator additional operating expense. 5
Some ships in the fleet have two engine rooms because of a
defense requirement. These ships are more expensive to oper-
ate because of the duplication of personnel and loss of cargo
space. The operating expense of a military requirement pro-
vided 1n a vessel is an exception but certainly a disadvantage
to the operator.
Some military requirements such as a speed requirement
may have international implications. A purely commercial
design ship may have a top speed of 18 knots. In order to
operate with a fast naval task force and take advantage of
protection forces, it is desired to have a speed of at least
21 knots in all ships. The Department of Defense will pay
for the cost of the additional speed provided in the ship.
The operator of this ship will have an economic advantage over
16
the other commercial operators because of his speed advantage.
The temptation of an operator to compete with the schedule of
a ship having a defense subsidy speed capability may be strong
and could result in economic suicide.
These types of problems are not new but are seldom dis-
cussed. If the replenishment of naval vessels at sea on a
regular basis, or forming any part of an Army or Marine assault
force is envisioned. a high quality, high performance ship is
required. The capabilities may also provide a commercial
economic advantage over competitors for the ship operator.
In addition to the damage control and speed characteris-
tics discussed, other military characteristics which should be
considered for installation on new construction or conversions
under the arrangement for payment by the Department of Defense
are:
a. Installed communications equipment compatible for
operations with the naval forces.
b • Transfer at sea stations. Equipment and fittings for
transfer of fuel and cargo at sea.
c. Helicopter landing platforms for all ship types;
tankers, transport, container ships and multi-purpose.
d. Command and control facilities on selected ships.
A command complex built in standard containers for placement
on a container ship could provide the service at sea, be moved
ashore at an objective area and moved back afloat upon comple-
tion of operations.
17
e. Heavy-lift boom capability for selected ships or ship
types for unique heavy military cargo not suitable for con-
tainers or barges.
This program may be expected to accelerate as the Mer-
chant Marine proves competent, c.ooperative and adaptable to
operating with the naval fleet. A civilian special assistant
for transportation to Navy Assistant Secretary for Installa-
tions and Logistics is optimistic about the new shipbuilding
program and the use of those ships. He is convinced that people
in the fleet w'ill provide new, innovative and creative ideas
for effective use of these assets. 6
Training and Mannin&. In 1964, "0pelration Steel Pike I"
was undertaken by a team consisting of Navy, Marine Corpsj and
Merchant Marine Forces. One hundred and forty-one ships, com-
batant, non-combatant, and merchant, carried 22,500 marines
and 180,000 measurement tons of material from the East Coast
of the United States to an operating area off Spain. At the
completion of this exercise the Secretary of the Navy reported
that in any size assault, reliance would be on the Merchant
Marine. 7 Current thinking considers integrated naval and
merchant fleet operations on a continuous training cycle.
U.S. Navy ships have become increasingly complex and
personnel availability is steadily decreasing. These factors
among others, have contributed to the need for reducing oper-
ating costs of naval and merchant ships. There can be many
18
Often thethings which cause a high ship operating cost.
largest single item is the crew. S
In the case of the Navy, it is possible for the crew to
contribute the major portion of the operating cost. If all
costs are considered, the Bureau of Naval Personnel has deter-
mined that the yearly costs can range from $4,400 for a seaman
to $80,000 for. an officer of the rank of Captain. 9 The Navy
or Merchant Marine cannot afford to decrease its effectiveness,
but resources are limited and efficient use of the people is
a necessity.
The Federal Maritime Commission Chairman, Helen Bentley,
has urged realistic manning standards for new U.S. flag
ships.lO Crew size should fulfill the needs of the ship and
particularly in the case of the merchant ships, should repre-
sent a realistic ratio of manpower to vessel equipment.
The Navy and Maritime Administration are conducting a
series of feasibility tests in the use of Merchant Marine
vessels with civilian crews in direct support of warships.
The normal crews on commercial vessels may be limited when
problems of maintaining several transfer stations are en-
countered. In two exercises in the Pacific conducted by mer-
chant tanker crewmen who are not ordinarily involved in this
type operation, their ability proved equal to the task. In
fact they demonstrated highly professional seamanship and
quickly adapted to the new problems. ll
19
The Navy and the Merchant Marine are natural partners.
They share a common environment, common professional practices,
common operations, common manpower sources and common dangers.
Achieving the goal of bUilding the Merchant Marine to be an
effective naval auxiliary will take human resources as well
as physical ships.
An interchange program of personnel on the operating ship
level as well as the transportation management level between
the commercial world and the Department of Defense would be
helpful. Each would bring an understanding of the problems of
their agency or industry and return with a better knowledge of
the requirements and problems of the other. Personnel with
this type experience can avoid many problems in the transpor-
tation field or initiate programs to solve problems with a
much improved chance of success. Cooperation and dialogue
between military departments and the commercial marine indus-
try will assure that the demands of national security will be
met.
Worldwide Command and Information System. In 1971 there
were apprOXimately 50,000 ships in the world larger than 100
gross tons. Over half of these ships are general cargo and
passenger vessels, about one quarter are fishing vessels and
the remainder are tankers, ore and bulk carriers and miscel-
laneous types. It 1s estimated that there are 11,632 vessels
at sea on any typical day.12
20
The maritime shipping industry has an image of being slow
to accept change, but this is currently changing. The industry
is highly competitive and ship movements are often not relia-
bly reported if reported at all. Published movements of fish-
ing vessels are non-existent. military ship movements are
generally not made public. and many commercial carriers do not
desire to publish routes and destinations for fear of revealing
information to a competitor.
To consider a worldwide, international data center in the
near future is unrealistic. However, a worldwide information
system for the U.S. flag fleets appears to be reasonable and
perhaps would eventually be accepted by allied nations.
The precedent for such an organization has been set.
One existing international program is the World Meteorological
Organization. The U.S. center, located in Washington. D.C .•
and managed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion (NOAA), provides a wide range of environmental data to
all nations participating in the program. 13 NOAA has brought
many of the Federal ocean and environmental agencies together
including the Navy-administered National Oceanographic Instru-
mentation Center. This program could provide great assistance
to the maritime world.
Considerations such as safety at sea, weather prediction,
search and rescue and mutual support of flag fleets, associa-
ted and friendly fleets could be enhanced. The Navy and some
21
private consulting firms have practiced the art of simple
weather routing for several years. 14
The Navy calls the system Optimum Track Ships' Routing
(OTSR). The details of a ship's performance are known for
various weather conditions. Based on the prognostic weather
and wave charts. ship optimum routing may be calculated for
a voyage and the ship advised of desired changes in route as
the voyage progresses.
This relatively simple exercise of using all available
data has saved an average of fourteen hours in voyage time for
MSC ships in ocean crossings. This is estimated to be a saving
of two million dollars each year. Shell oil tankers in the
Atlantic have saved an average of eighteen hours per voyage. 15
Other savings include a reduction in heavy weather damage to
the Ship's structure, cargo and passenger or crew comfort.
It is envisioned that for specific naval tasks such as
refueling of ships, the information center could provide a
ship in need of fuel with a description of the tanker nearest
which contains the desired fuel type and a capability to pro-
vide such a service. Perhaps the Navy could be the leader in
such a program now that it is seriously in the role of cooper-
ating with the U.S. commercial flag fleets. Centralized
information may be provided even though one may not necessarily
have command or control of a vessel. If the United States is
to grow to meet the ocean challenge of the future it seems
22
clear that there should be a central information system cOn-
eerning her afloat units. Ship time and lives saved, aside
from the economic savings ~hich may be realized, could pro-
vide incentive for adoption of such a concept.
Consolidation, cooperation and integrated systems ~ithin
government and internationally are key words in the ~orld of
today. They also a~ply to methods of improving ocean trans-
portation. In the next decade it is anticipated that the
number of ships On the oceans will increase by forty pereent. 16
These will be larger and faster ships than those presently
known. Part of this increase 1s not in total numbers, but is
due to the efficlen~y and a savings in turn around time in
port. The more efficient ships will spend more time at sea
each year as compared to inport days.
The most dense concentration of vessels will continue to
be in the approaches to Europe. Traffic in the Western Pacific
and Indian Ocean will increase. The traffic through the Strait
of Malacca is expected to approach that of Dover Strait. 17
All this is bound to nave prof0und effects on navigation, safety,
communications and the maritime industry in general.
As ocean traffic lanes and patterns are accepted and
"'freedom of the sea" is diminished, the potential of a unify-
ing, co,ordinated cent-ral information system will become apparent.
The Navy, w±th~n the umbrella of NOAA in its role a6 an oceano-
graphtc and charting agent, could provide a direct economic
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and indirect social service to the United States in this type
of operation.
The U.S. maritime comeback that is commencing can be suc-
cessful if all parties; Defense, shipbuilding, unions, operators
and concerned government agencies work together in making all
beneficiaries of new technology, and not the victims of it.
The Navy can do much more than "live with it"; it could provide
the leadership.
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CHAPTER III
SEALIFT AND INTERMODAL TRANSPORT
Potential of Commercial Sealift for Military Use. The
Merchant Marine is a commercial operation and depends on
profits to remain in existence. Competition is keen 1n marine
transportation and operators have found that such a high degree
of efficiency and productivity is required, it has resulted in
specialized ships. The vessels used in the dry cargo trade
are generally called "container ships,lI although the term is
inclusive of several types of specialized ships utilizing
intermodal transport. Whether they are roll-on/roll-off,
partial or full container configurations, or lighters aboard
ship. the dramatic change is in the methods of packaging the
cargo in a form which will reduce handling costs.
The ships may get larger and faster, but the fundamental
character of the ocean going displacement type of ship is not
expected to change.! Innovations and technological advances
in containerization should be expected to continue to change
in an evolutionary manner as more economically sound adapta-
tions are found.
New developments are often considered to render existing
material obsolete. They may merely present a degree of super-
iority in performance or a departure in design. Rarely has a
new invention made existing equipment obsolete at once. 2 The
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obsolete is still worth considering in a surnmat;10,n of the
relative power among nations. In the subject of shipping under
discussion, it sho'uld be observed that the "container revolu~
tion" is moving so fast, one cannot make plans to use current
shipping assets and then set them aside figuring the problem
of utilizing these ships is solved. The maritime industry is
expanding and modernizing. U.S. flag container ships presently
carry sixty percent of the world's container trade and with
additional ships as a result of the new maritime policy, 'this
will increase. 3 The potential military users of these ships
would be negligent if they did not adapt plans to new innova-
tions and work with the industry in utilizing the capability
of the modern intermodal transport systems.
Roll-on, Roll-off. Some military cargo such as tractors,
buses, heavy construction vehicles, and other type truck or
wheeled vehicles find themselves in the special position of odd
and oversized cargo. When compared to the much more productive
and successful standardized shipping container they do presgnl
a problem. The best answer for this type cargo is the roll-onl
roll-off container ship.
This vessel handles containers on deck and anything that
can be pushed, pulled or driven aboard is loaded into the ves-
selover a stern or side ramp. The rolling cargo may be loaded
or discharged at a pier. barge alongside or any type platform.
This vessel has military applic.ation in an amphibious
assault follow-on echelon when poor beach or pier facilities
may be all that is available.
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The speeds of second gene~ation combination roll-onl
roll-off container ships will be app~oximately twenty-four
knots. 4 This speed is compatible with the modern naval amphib-
ious task force of twenty knots.
The computer capability in this ship could be useful in
operations involving routing, scheduling, and other integrated
requirements. It may also be used in providing the port ter-
minals, ship and task force commander information on the
location of cargo and the availability of space in his ships.
COntainer shi~s. The primary aim of the pure container
ship is to move goods as quickly and cheaply as possible. The
container reduces the nQmber of times a piece of general cargo
is handled and facilitates intermodal transfer. Ideally this
system forms the nucleus of a total transportation system
which has specially desigfied terminals and equipment for the
loading and unloading of ships and the transporting, sorting,
and storing of various containers. S Indications are this is
the type of transportation that will be in operation in the
commercial shipping industry in the immediate time period and
the near future. It provides advantages and some serious dis-
advantages for a role in providing transport for national
defense emergencies. The facts are that these are the types
of ships that are operational and soon will be in the NDRF as
the industry changes and builds other mod~ications. The
Depa~tment of Defense planners should think and plan positively
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in adapting to this type cargo movement and quit bemQaning the
shortage of the physically and economically obsolete break-
bulk ship.
There are startling advantages of container versus con-
ventional break-bulk operations for the military operator as
well as the commeTcial carrier. Shipping companies have been
quick to invest in various types of container sbips. With a
given container s~ze for the same slot utilization aboard ship,
total costs decline as ship size and speed increases. This
has driven ship speed up to about twenty-five knots. Above
this speed, twin screw propulsion is required and costs increase. 6
This particular impact is favorable as it would apply in the
field of mi.litary logistic$.
All types of container ships will have to be used 1n a
resupply phase in future emergencies. As container ships
become more prevalent and a severe shortage of break-bulk 9hi~s
exists for defense use, perhaps more will be knuwn about how
to take advantage of the intermodal container and its transport
vehicles in satisfying military needs. The intermodal trans-
portation system vehicles may include ships) trucks, railroads,
aircraft and port handling equipment.
Aside from the cargo functions. an opportunity exists for
adapting military requirements to utilize the containerization
mode of transport for special purposes. CQntai~ers could be
modified for use as barracks or berths for troop transport,
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dining and galley spaces, command and communication centers,
mobile power stations, repair shops and other support facili-
ties. These standard containers may be rigged for liquid
filled tanks, flat bed platforms, ammunition stowage and other
adaptations while maintaining their overall dimensions. The
trailer industry has made significant advances in this type
service with portable classrooms, on site repair shops, power
packages, food service, sanitary units and traveling libraries. 7
Marine units for defense use would be of standard size
with corner fittings for handling. They would be furnished
with all essential services such as electricity, lighting,
refrigeration, water, etc., depending on the intended use.
Three major advantages quickly appear. Many ships will
be compatible with the transport of these specialized containers
which are devoted to defense needs, the container units may be
lifted ashore by helicopter from ships underway, and of par-
ticular importance, the units may be returned to the U.S. after
use in some overseas contingency.
Operational helicopters commonly found in the fleet can
presently lift only loads of up to ten tons. Development con-
tracts are in progress for a heavy-lift helicopter capable of
lifting up to twenty-seveo tons. B This helicopter will handle
any container or military vehicle requiring short distance
air lift.
The shipping strain brought on by the Vietnan conflict
forced the Navy to experiment with shipping ammunition in
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containers. Containers) loaded topside, subject to heavy weath-
er encountered during the voyage removed all doubts as to the
feasibility of shipping munitions in containers for fleet
use. 9 Perhaps data, experience and confidence gained in this
exercise will encourage defense management to explore advan-
tages of other types container delivery. Given the capability
of heavy helicopter lift, containers may be used for routine
supply and stores transfer at sea from commercial ships much
like the civilian tanker refueling operations.
LASH and SEABEE. The development of Lighter Aboard Ship
(LASH) and Sea Barge (SEABEE) carrie~s is a new oeparture in
the handling of all types of cargos. The system offers possi-
bilities to avoid the traditional problems of port congestion
and shows promise for military application.
For the layman, the scene of a bustling port or harbor
facility has bgen the traditional symbol of thriving seaborne
trade. For the ship operators and the military commander, these
scenes typify port congestion, delay, additional expense and
loss of some alternatives to the military planner. The two
barge carrying types of vessels, LASH and SEABEE. provide
floating cargo holds whicb may be pre-stowed, ready to be
loaded aboard the mother ship.
The floating holds which are barges or lighters. may be
lifted aboard and discharged from the ship using the ship's
own equipment. The basic difference between the t~o systems
is the manner in which the ship loads and discharges the barges.
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LASH uses an overhead traveling crane to handle her barges
and SEABEE uses a subm~rged elevator to pick the barges out
of the water and a horizontal rail system with self-powered
10dollies, called transporters to move the barges fore and aft.
Among th~ advantages of these systems is the ability of
the mother ships to load and unload barges in roadsteads or
estuaries, away from dock and piers. Marshalling barges at
various locations within a port and then moving them by tugs
out to deeper water eliminates the problem of harbors too
shallow to accommodate deep draft ships.
This capability translates directly into advantages for
use of these ships as m~litary auxiliaries in the defense role.
The barges may be loaded and sealed, towed to a marshalling
site or dispersed for unloading at various locations without
regard for the location of the mother ship.
The barges for both the LASH and SEABEE systems are com-
patible with the container mode of shipment. Containers may
be placed in the barges or on top of the upper layer of barges
when loaded aboard ship.II All benefits discussed in the use of
the full or partial container ship also apply to the barge
systems.
Figure V and Table VI in Appendix II show the expansion
in the trade routes and numbers of LASH ships expected to be op~
erational in the near future. There is a two-fald benefit chat
should not be overlooked when considering the defense shipping
problems. The commercial operators and seamen will be familiar
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with a large amount of the world's ocean and ports. They will
also have a considerable number of ships at their disposal.
It is recognized that the commercial flow of goods cannot stop
and let defense have all the shipping, however, there is a
valuable contribution that this total LASH organization and
others similar to it can make if properly utilized.
Defense planners should get their imaginations to work and
coordinate with the commercial industry through all avenues
possible in applying this new technology and operational exper-
ience to defense purposes when and if the need arises.
Future Shipping Tren~. The need to transport an annually
growing bulk of goods for more people is a basic assumption if
conditions of living in the world are to follow the rising
path which is the vague universal ideal. It seems that for
the foreseeable future the ship will remain as the vehicle for
the bulk of world trade.
The volume of shipping recorded and predicted for world
trade is summarized in Table VII, Appendix II. It can be
observed that as the population doubles, the shipping capacity
will quadruple. The U.S. will have its fair share of the mer-
chant marine required to carry this trade if the present mood
for maritime affairs continues.
The benefits of marine transportation whatever its immed-
iate political objective will be subject to rapid changes as
a result of economic competition and the resulting constraints
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on ship configurations for high productivity. Innovations in
the maritime industry and government are resulting in programs
showing that a modern and efficient Merchant Marine can be
built and maintained.
The Navy as the Department of Defense ~epresentative for
the defense sealift requiremenC has the legislative requireIDent
and the inroads for a truly working relationship with the
maritime industry. It is now up to interested people in the
organization to plan with the Maritime Administration, Depart-
ment of Defense and the Federal Maritime Commission. No one
should be caught by surprise in preblems which may arise out
of new systems such as the proposed rigid tug-barge system t
the transitional container ship.
The tug-barge concept for ocean shipping has emerged
which allows the propulsion plant and living quarters (the
tug) to pick up and release barges (the ship) by fitting into
a notch at the stern of the vessel. 12 Savings in ship manning
levels, dead time in port for the propulsion unie, and versa-
tility for the operational and maintenance schedule of the
tug units are envisioned. Are the defense officials coord in-
sting with industry in order to make plans compatible with use
of such equipment or to be even aware that problems may be
emerging in the future should something like the rigid tug-
barge tanker be alongstde a destroyer for refueling?
Military logisticians are considering a multi-purpose
vessel, the transitional container ship. This vessel would
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be particularly well-suited to much of the MSC dry cargo ship-
ment. It would have the ability to operate efficiently with
break-bulk, pallets, unit lifts for containers or any combina-
tion. For commercial operators it would have the ability to
switch trades from break-bulk or containers as the shipping
rates changed. 13 To be a real asset the ship must be worth
chartering and competitive in a commercial trade.
Multi-purpose cargo vessels are operating in the British
trade. A typical ship can carry 620 containers and bulk,
lumber or cars. The ship has cranes, large hatches and col-
lapsible tween decks for added flexibility.14
One wonders if such a ship were constructed by the Depart-
ment of Defense. would it have the advantage of haVing had the
commercial shippers' input in the design? If there is a real
need for shipping for defense purposes, recall it's only ready
if operational, and it will be operational only if it is com-
mercially competitive.
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CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The administration is well aware that policies and
strategies more compatible with the realities of the U.S.
strategic-geographic environment and the current challetlge
will require considerable adjustment. The low profile of the
Nixon Doctrine, for e~ample. visualizes a phase down of the
u.s. military presence on Asian territory. As strength on land
is phased down, the burden of presence and support for the area
may be taken up only by somewhat comparable strength based at
sea. This will a180 be true in other areas around the world.
With nearly three-quarters of the u.s. Merchant Marine
and nearly half the U.S. Navy composed of ships twenty years
of age or older~ a strong justification for the construction
of modern, efficient ships to replace old, inefficient vessels
is logical.
U.S. geography and the compelling national survival prob-
lem clearly suggests that the national budget should emphasize
s.ea forces. An understanding that seapower is a mix of naval,
merchant, fishing, scientific fleets and the shore based train-
ing, building and repair facilities for their support is essen-
tial. The extent to which these forces successfully compete
with other governmental activities and are guided by common
supporting and cooperative policies will determine the quality
of U.S. strength at sea for years to come.
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There is room for improved efficiency in the use of the
resources devoted to all the agencies concerned with national
defense and to seapower in particular. There is a growing
demand to rethink and restructure administrative. organiza-
tioDal and practical operating relationships in order to maxi-
mize the amount and quality of defense received in return for
investment.
With the advent of the nuclear age, a tendency developed
to discard the traditional roles in matters of national defense
and related areas. Adding to the difficulties of national
security are the social programs in competition for a good
share of the national budget. The problem, now and in the
foreseeable future. is a simple one of cost in relation to the
total federal budget.
Realism suggests that annual appropriations for naval
construction and merchant shipbuilding will be something less
than the documented requirements for defense and commercial
interests. It is inconceivable that the U.S. will resort to
allowing all U.S. exports and imports to be carried by the
ships of other nations. It is also unlikely that the U.S.
will depend on allied nations to protect U.S. shores and pre-
serve U.S. interests at sea. Putting all these points together,
one can see a slow but increasing level of activity in U.S.
~aritime industry.
Events have shown that rather than diminishing in impor-
tance, merchant ships have become more than ever a measure of
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national security and economic well being. Other nations,
notably the Soviet Union, have threatened to remove the U.S.
as a leading seafaring nation. Until recently, it appeared
they may succeed. The situation has changed with the adoption
of the new ten year, three hundred ship construction program.
This new fleet of ships can be utilized to a greater degree
in support of this country if there can also be some degree of
mutual support and coordination in the operation and employment
of the naval and merchant fleets. New ideas in the employment,
management, construction, capabilities and technical innova-
tions in U.S. shipping invites the opportunity for improved
and expanded roles for both military and commercial national
maritime influence.
In addition to improving the national defense, the U.S.
maritime fleet can, for the first time in decades, have a
strong economic position in competition with foreign flag
fleets. The U.S. stands to benefit both in terms of national
defense and balance of payments.
Shipbuilding budgets have not been sufficient in recent
decades to maintain and modernize the U.S. Navy. With the
compelling need to modernize its aging combatant fleet, the
Navy has now turned to the U.S. Merchant Marine to provide an
increasing proportion of its logistic support. This is accepted
as normal procedure in times of emergency. With some planning
and understanding on the part of the merchant and naval leaders,
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this program can be successful and could lead to a routine
mode of operation for the U.S. merchant and naval fleets of
the future. The Navy and Maritime Administration are presently
conducting joint exercises to permit naval combatant ships to
fuel at sea from a commercially manned tanker. If this con-
cept proves successful the Department of Defense and Navy
could be expected to provide additional support for merchant
shipbuilding.
An adequate U.S. Merchant Marine will provide a large
reservoir of ships, which could be converted quickly to mili-
tary logistic support functions. Planning, training and opera-
tions together on a routine basis could only increase the
effectiveness of joint Navy-Merchant Marine forces in a national
emergency.
In addition to the routine logistic support, the Merchant
Marine can provide forces for naval combat augmentation. Even
if provided unlimited shipbuilding funds today, the Navy would
find it impossible to build the additional combatant support
ships needed to meet all naval requirements associated with a
major emergency in the 1970's. The Navy would be compelled to
turn to the Merchant Marine, as has been done in the past for
the large number of various support capabilities needed to
perform combat tasks.
The traditional role of the Merchant Marine's military
support function is sealift. Sealift is the great bulk of all
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the military supplies and equipment needed to sustain and
operate military forces and installations overseas. New ship-
ping technology such as barge carrying ships, full and partial
container ships, rigid ocean tug-barge combinations in addt~
tion to the coordinated management and control innovations
allowing these fleets to operate together in times other than
national emergencies is a new breaktbrough in maritime affairs.
This coordination can directly enhance the potential of both
fleets.
The more the Navy is accustomed to utilizing standard
merchant shipping and merchant crews in peacetime training and
support operations, the more efficient the combined role will
be in a crisis. There is an agreement between the Secretary
of Defense and the Secretary of Commerce which addresses this
problem. It is recognized tbat the mo~e the government agencies
use the U.s. flag commercial fleet, the more they will encour-
age private investment in the additional merchant fleet capa-
city desired.
With the U.S. flag shtpping carrying less than five per-
cent of the volume of U.S. trade, it appears more needs to be
done to strengthen knowledge and capacity for peaceful maritime
competition. The expansion and competition of the Russian
merchant marine and navy on all oceans has helped in justifying
a new shipbuilding program.
For the foreseeable future, the Navy will have to depend
on the support of existing merchant hulls as it shifts from
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naval auxiliary vessels to merchant ship support. Aside from
a basic military capability such as speed, damage control,
communications, and hull fittings, these ships will be of
commercial design. The Department of Defense and the U.S. Navy
in particular will have to tailor its plans, stowage and usage
to make the best use of what capability the commercial shipping
industry has to offer.
In the containership trade, military equipment and stores
will have to be adapted to accept the capability that presently
exists and is expected to ekist as the industry adapts to re-
main in competition. Concepts in utilizing the LASH and SEABEE
vessels offer a challenge to the military planners. Along with
the physical accommodation to blend the commercial carrier to
military use, a central information system providing such data
as routes, cargo and mission would give the national command
authority a decided advantage in the event of mobilization of
any scale. Once the naval and merchant fLeets gain a feeling
of real mutual support and respect for on~ another's role,
the coordinated fleets should prove fa~ ~ore valuable than the
sum total of independent capability.
Other seagoing industries such as the fishing fleet could
be envisioned as a valuable asset in an expansion of the con~
cept of a coordinated maritime plan to be utilized by the
national authority in the growing international effort.
The future appears certain to be an era of rapid change
and adaptation to new operational and logistic concepts. The
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intermodal container and utilization of the merchant fleet on
a peacetime basis will impact on every function in the manage-
ment of naval resources. The concept of civilian and commer-
cia! support of operational naval forces can be extended to
the manning of repair aad depot ships at advanced bases or in
continental U.S. home ports.
Eventually the naval fleet can be joined by hundreds of
new and improved vessels of various types. The creation of a
strong U.S. flag merchant fleet will make it possible to be
free from dependence on foreign flag vessels for shipping. A
stronger maritime position may be obtained through a development
of integrated marine resources planning. The U.S. can be in
a position to deliver commercial cargo to any point in the world
or support any naval force using modern, compatible u.s. ships;
merchant and naval in joint operations.
The door is open for innovations that will increase the
efficiency of both the operational forces and the logistic
support ashore. Hardware technology has provided many new
tools and it remains for management technology to provide new
operational tools. In this instance, efficiency, and increased
productivity can result in a military-industry team effort in
meeting the maritime challenge.
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APPENDIX I
STATEMENT OF THE
MINISTER OF WAR TRANSPORT
Excerpts from a personal letter from Lord Leathers. Minister
of War Transport to the Imperial General Staff during Wdrld
War II
. We are now embarking on a series of amphib-
ious operations in which merchant ships, carrying
troops and equLpment actually sail into the battle
line. Nor is this a temporary phase. Even after
Germany is conquered there are bound to be innum-
erable combined operations throughout the Pacific
and Indian Oceans. Merchant shipping has become a
fourth service so far as major combined operations
are concerned. This development makes it imperative
that I and my Department should be more closely
integrated with the joint military planning organi-
zation than has been the case in the past .
. The Joint Planning Staff is aware of the
relation of shipping to scrategy, but I am not con-
vinced that those engaged in planning are equally
alive to the needs of the situation. It is not
only that we have not always been consulted, more
often it is that we have been consulted too late.
Plans are laid and decisions taken and we are asked
to provide ship~ing to fit in with these plans.
this we have usually been able to do but at an un-
necessary sacrifice. If we had been present in the
earlier stages of the planning, before the outlines
crystallized or any decisions were taken, we would,
I am certain often been able to suggest modifications,
which while acceptable from the military angle, would
still have effected a real economy of shipping. If
we know Ln time there are all sorts of ways in which
we can minimize the strain on our carrying capacity.
We can work suitable ships into position. We can
make modifications in the time-tables for meeting
other demands. We can arrange to carry deck cargo
or span deck tankers (which we specially provided
in anticipation of needs - an example of what can
be done by infor~ed foresight). We can carry use-
ful flatting or cut out ballast. There are innum-
erable permutations and commutations which would
in their cumulative effect achieve a substantial
saving in shipping .
Source: C.B.A. Behrens, Merchant Shippi~g an~ the Demands
of War (London: Her Majesty's Stationery 6ffice and Longmans,
Gr.een and Co., 1955), p. 337, 338.
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APPENDIX II
TABLES AND FIGURES
TABLE r
STATUS OF AMERICAN NERCHANT MARINE
1 FEBRUARY 1972
TOTAL U.S.-FLAG MERCHANT FLEET (LOOO GROSS TONS AND OVER)
ACTIVE
Passenger/Cargo Freighter Tanker
Privately Owned 11 376 226
Government Owned 17 3
T'o.It a-l 11 393 229
U~DER CONStRUCTION
Privately Owned
Government Owned
Passenger/Cargo
a
o
F~eighter
25*
o
Tanker
17
o
Other
15
o
Total - 57
UNDERGOING CONVERSION
Privately Owned
Government Owned
Passenger/Cargo
o
o
Freighter
14*
o
Tanker
3
o
Total - 17
Construction and Conversion Total - 74
*Containerships
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce News, Maritime
Administration, Washington: MR NR 72~11, Merchant Mar~ne
Data Sheet, 1 February 1972, p. 2 and 3.
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TABLE II
U.S. CONTROLLED MERCHANT SHIPS
(1000 GROSS TONS AND OVER)
Total No. Foreign
Ships U.S~~~_~ FlaiL- NDRF
Dry Cargo 899 409 116 316
Passenger/Cargo
Transport 60 15 6 39
Tankers 588 265 288 35
Merchant Type
Military Aux. 259 259
Total (All Types) 1806 689 410 651
U.S. Controlled Merchant Fleet consists of American flag
vessels and selected U.S. owned vessels under flag of con-
venience registry. Foreign flag ships under rlEffective
U.S. Control" are provided War Risk Insurance from the U.S.
Government.
Source: Military Sealift Command Data Sheet MSC-3C
dated 29 February 1972. MSC Form 3110/6 (11-70).
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TABLE III
NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET
(NDRF)
Date
1950
1960
1965
1968
Total Ships
2277
2000
1594
1062
Date
1969
1970
1971
1972
Total Ships
1017
1027
860
651 ,',
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, MARAD 1971 - Year
of Br~akthr~u~ (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 197I~
p. 69.
*Update Source for 1972: U. S~~partment o_~Commer~e
News (Washington: Merchant Marine Data Sheet, MRNR 72-11,
1 February 1972, p. 1.
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TABLE IV
SHIPBUILDING BUDGETS
(Millions)
FY-7l FY-72 FY-73
Navy Shipbuilding
and Conversion $2465.4 $3328.9 $3564.3
Navy Ship Repair and
Alteration 750.0 856.0 920.0
Merchant Ship Con-
struction 187.5 229.7 250.0
Source: "Shipwork in FY-73 Budget Nearly $5 Billion,"
Shipyard Wee~ (Washington: Shipbuilding Council of America,
3 February 1972, p. 1.
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FIGURE V
LASH - A WORLD-WIDE TRADE ROUTE
!
I
!)
--...I....--I- J;.--I---l·J ;/
~ --;?'---t--=:f~l- -
Tr;)<I(' ~~Illle for 1 !
--- LASH ship OJ)('r.lilll!.
or 011 filln older
, 11:=7
A LASH trade route, linking major world ports has been
established. The 22 LASH ships operated or on order will
serve ports in North America, South America, Europe, Asia,
Africa and Australia.
Establishment of this worldwide LASH service offers
greater benefits for shippers and operators because the
standard dimensions of LASH lighters permit efficient
interchange from ship to ship and trade route to trade
route.
Source: Fairplay International Shipping Jou!nal,
20 January 1972, p. 36.
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TABLE VI
LIGHTER ABOARD SHIP (LASH) GROWTH CHART
Number of Ships
Year (operating or on ord~.~
1969 1
1970 4
1971 8
1972 15
1973 19
1974 24
Source: Fairplay International Shipping Journal,
23 September 1971, p. 17.
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TABLE VII
WORLD SHIPPING CAPACITY AND WORLD POPULATION
Shipping Capacity World Population
Year (lOOO's gross t~ns ) (millions)
1939 61 2000
1958 114 2800
1965 154 3000
1984 244 ? 4000
Source: D.
Ives Huntingdon:
Phillips-Birt. The Future of Ships, Saint
Imray Laurie Norie and Wilson, 1970, p. 7.
? NOTE: Although in different format, data in the follow-
ing publication confirms the Phillips-Birt estimate: Maritime
Transport Committee, Mariti~e Transport 1970, Paris: Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 1970.
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